Somali Strikes

I suppose my mention of Black Hawk Down was a little ironic, because probably the most interesting news these days (in an otherwise boring news patch of the month for those of us not interested in Rosie O'Donnell) has been this week's American airstrikes on targets in southern Somalia. The targets were three suspects thought to be the masterminds behind the 1998 East African Embassy bombings. Reports have been all over the place in the past week: originally it was claimed that al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri was among the targets (quite a feat considering that Predator drones were attempting to target him in a village in northern Pakistan this time last year). Now reports are saying that none of the suspects were actually hit.

The airstikes have brought the usual international criticism. Let us look past any resurrected, tired rhetoric to analyse what is occuring. One the one hand, these strikes can be seen as a potential success: as in Afghanistan, they are providing strong air support to local ground forces pursuing targets of the American national interest. In this sense, it is a good example of well-applied force for national gain (on America's part). It also provides useful support to the Somali Transitional Government that the American government wishes to succeed.

Speaking for myself, however, I question the value of this intervention. One, the current administration is appearing to fall for its same traps all over again as in Afghanistan. When Bush made it clear so many years ago that hunting individual terrorist masterminds (like Bin Laden, or OBL once you get your security clearance) is a waste of military resources, why then go at it all over again, with potentially the same limited results? With all this talk of a decisive troop surge in Iraq, do we need naval and air forces committed to Somalia (they could surely provide our troops on the ground with some strong support in the upcoming weeks in Baghdad).

Foremost, as I have questioned time and again concerning the Iraq strategy, what exactly is the intended end result? The Islamic Courts Union has been routed from Mogadishu, and in its place the local warlords have returned to their bad old ways, complete with a resurgence of the qat narcotic (Afghanistan, anyone?). An allegedly democratic and secular, UN-recognized government now sits in Mogadishu, but these descriptive terms are essentially just promises invoked in hope of expected international aid. The writ of this government doesn't extend far beyond the capital (Puntland is a self-governing region, and Somaliland is a fully functioning - if unrecognized - independent country). Unlike Afghanistan, the new government exists almost solely through the military efforts of Ethiopia, a veteran of bloody conflict against Somalis. This is more akin to the US supporting Russian troops in taking Kabul from the Taliban. One look at some of the images of Ethiopia's armed forces should show that this regional power isn't at a Russian level of professionalism (the troops more closely resemble day-laborers armed with 50 caliber machine guns). Furthermore, there appears evidence that Somalia is being used as a proxy conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, while Ethiopia's own local civil wars are mixing into Somalia as Somalis in Ogaden attack the Ethiopian military, and the Ethiopian military rounds up Oromos (a long-fighting and oppressed plurality ethnic group in Ethiopia) in Mogadishu. Anyone the least bit familiar with armed conflict in Africa knows that this chaotic maelstrom is par for the course.

Despite an American desire, (from the American right as well as left) to see all Islamists as one global enemy, I am not sure what is to be gained by encouraging the current situation in Somalia. The US is ill-equipped to undertake another nation-building task, and as far as I can tell not likely to convince any capable power to undertake such a feat. I can quickly foresee the Somalis tiring of Ethiopian rule and giving greater and greater aid to an ICU insurgency against the foreign invader, especially more so to one now openly backed by the US (we have not been so popular in Mogadishu since 1993). More to the point, this is exactly what ICU leaders have planned from even before their "defeat" (and what many Somalis worldwide expect). Ethiopia itself is a less-than ideal partner in this endeavor, as beyond the traditional hostility to it in Somalia it is an autocratic country accused of fixing elections, massacring demonstrators and sending political opponents to labor camps (but for whatever reason is a darling of international donors, as well as the headquarters of the African Union, and therefore apparently beyond reproach). The region, furthermore, is terribly environmentally degraded and overpopulated, which makes it an even worse ticking bomb to tinker with. This seems like another mess that the US has gotten involved in with little clear idea of what is at stake, or what a desired yet realistic outcome would be. I thought we learned enough of that in 1993.

In any case, the picture above is of a Lockheed AC-130, used to target enemy ground forces with massive amounts of fire power, and supposedly used in the strikes in Somalia. There are 21 in active service, mostly used by the US Air Force Special Operations Command. It was first brought into service over Nha Trang, Viet Nam in 1967. They can provide one hell of a suppressive firepower, but admittedly their usage would seem limited when trying to specifically find and target three suspects in mangrove swamps. Ironically, one of two AC-130s lost in service exploded over Somalia in 1994 (the other was shot down in 1991 in Iraq...).


fg